Running Head: GEOGRAPHIC INQUIRY ISU POSITION PAPER ON BIOSECURITY
Running Head: GEOGRAPHIC INQUIRY ISU POSITION PAPER ON BIOSECURITY
BIOSECURITY
Jonathan Wilson
Ms. Paolini
CGW 4U1
Synopsis Worksheet
JOURNAL: Biosecurity and the international response to HIV/AIDS: governmentality, globalisation and security -This article is about the issue of HIV/AIDS being addressed on an international level. It is also about HIV/AIDS relation to concerns of globalisation and security. The article considers biosecurity and international response in terms of problematization and institutionalisation. (PRINTED) Ingram, A. (2010). Biosecurity and the international response to HIV/AIDS: Governmentality, globalisation and security. Area,42(3), 293-301.
JOURNAL: Biosecurity and Research: Minimizing Adverse Impacts – In this article, biosecurity research is the main focus. They are concerned with actions being taken relating to biosecurity and the impacts of them. Whether or not more security for a specific biological agent is required is a topic in this article as well. (EMAIL) Gaudioso, J., & Salerno, R. (2004). Biosecurity and Research: Minimizing Adverse Impacts. Science, 304(5671), 687-687.
JOURNAL: The Development of an Exposure Risk Index as a Rational Guide for Biosecurity Programs - This article includes how biosecurity programs and disease control measures can be directed at those areas of greatest risk. The article includes information of animals being vulnerable to disease reservoirs. Risk analyses are sets of tools to support biosecurity decision making in systematic ways. (PRINTED) Halvorson, D., & Hueston, W. (2006). The Development of an Exposure Risk Index as a Rational Guide for Biosecurity Programs Avian Diseases, 50(4), 516-519.
JOURNAL: Biosecurity's unruly spaces -This article is about the geopolitics of the animal health governance. South Africa is faced with a biosecurity event in their pig sector. This article’s case is one that is defined not by differences between nations but one by a complex patchwork of secure and unruly spaces. (PRINTED) MATHER, C., & MARSHALL, A. (2011). Biosecurity's unruly spaces. The Geographical Journal, 177(4), 300-310
JOURNAL: Biosecurity: Moving toward a Comprehensive Approach- It states in the article how a comprehensive approach to biosecurity is necessary to minimize the risk of harm caused by non-native organisms to agriculture. This also includes the economy, the environment, and human health. Also does a good job of defining biosecurity. A comprehensive approach to biosecurity is necessary to minimize the risk of harm caused by non-native organisms to agriculture, the economy, the environment, and human health. (EMAIL) Laura A. Meyerson, Jamie K. Reaser; Biosecurity: Moving toward a Comprehensive Approach BioScience, Volume 52, Issue 7, 1 July 2002, Pages 593–600
JOURNAL: Survey of Biosecurity Protocols and Practices Adopted by Growers on Commercial Poultry Farms in Georgia, U. S. A. - It states in the article how biosecurity practices are an important component of modern flock health programs. This article also includes info about the integrated commercial poultry system. It is a connected network and is important to farms nearby Georgia. (PRINTED) Dorea, F., Berghaus, R., Hofacre, C., & Cole, D. (2010). Survey of Biosecurity Protocols and Practices Adopted by Growers on Commercial Poultry Farms in Georgia, U. S. A. Avian Diseases,54(3), 1007-1015
JOURNAL: Biosecurity Governance for the Real World - It states in the article about building a contextual approach to governance that is appropriate for the complex practice of real-world science. The US government continue their efforts to govern the security concerns of biological research. Building conversations across areas of relevant expertise was also a key point in this article. (EMAIL) EVANS, S. (2016). Biosecurity Governance for the Real World. Issues in Science and Technology, 33(1), 84-88.
JOURNAL: Biosecurity Goes Global – This article is about the world dealing with the new threat of bioterrorism. Back then U.K officials were preparing for a bioweapons convention. The article includes how biosecurity needs to be implanted to avoid a global catastrophe. (EMAIL) Malakoff, D. (2004). Biosecurity Goes Global. Science, 305(5691), 1706-1707.
JOURNAL: Strategic Incentives in Biosecurity Actions: Theoretical and Empirical Analyses – In the article, they model a game between two players taking biosecurity actions. This article deals with proving that an improved understanding of factors affecting biosecurity actions and regulatory mechanisms attempting to prevent the spread of invasive is exceptionally important. The article also goes on to state how catastrophic outcomes are often caused by poor biosecurity actions of one or a small group of private biological agents. (EMAIL) Kobayashi, M., & Melkonyan, T. (2011). Strategic Incentives in Biosecurity Actions: Theoretical and Empirical Analyses. Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 36(2), 242-262.
JOURNAL: From biodefence to biosecurity: the Obama administration's strategy for countering biological threats – This article is about in 2009, when President Barack Obama called for a 'world free of nuclear weapons' and proposed several new measures to reduce the risks posed by nuclear material and weapons. The speech immediately grabbed headlines around the world. The article deals with an overviewing of Obama’s biosecurity strategy. (EMAIL) KOBLENTZ, G. (2012). From biodefence to biosecurity: The Obama administration's strategy for countering biological threats. International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-),88(1), 131-148.
REFERENCES
· JOURNAL: Biosecurity and the international response to HIV/AIDS: governmentality, globalisation and security - (PRINTED) Ingram, A. (2010). Biosecurity and the international response to HIV/AIDS: Governmentality, globalisation and security. Area,42(3), 293-301.
· JOURNAL: Biosecurity and Research: Minimizing Adverse Impacts – (EMAIL) Gaudioso, J., & Salerno, R. (2004). Biosecurity and Research: Minimizing Adverse Impacts. Science, 304(5671), 687-687.
· JOURNAL: The Development of an Exposure Risk Index as a Rational Guide for Biosecurity Programs - (PRINTED) Halvorson, D., & Hueston, W. (2006). The Development of an Exposure Risk Index as a Rational Guide for Biosecurity Programs Avian Diseases, 50(4), 516-519.
· JOURNAL: Biosecurity's unruly spaces - (PRINTED) MATHER, C., & MARSHALL, A. (2011). Biosecurity's unruly spaces. The Geographical Journal, 177(4), 300-310
· JOURNAL: Biosecurity: Moving toward a Comprehensive Approach- (EMAIL) Laura A. Meyerson, Jamie K. Reaser; Biosecurity: Moving toward a Comprehensive Approach BioScience, Volume 52, Issue 7, 1 July 2002, Pages 593–600
· JOURNAL: Survey of Biosecurity Protocols and Practices Adopted by Growers on Commercial Poultry Farms in Georgia, U. S. A. (PRINTED) Dorea, F., Berghaus, R., Hofacre, C., & Cole, D. (2010). Survey of Biosecurity Protocols and Practices Adopted by Growers on Commercial Poultry Farms in Georgia, U. S. A. Avian Diseases,54(3), 1007-1015
· JOURNAL: Biosecurity Governance for the Real World - (EMAIL) EVANS, S. (2016). Biosecurity Governance for the Real World. Issues in Science and Technology, 33(1), 84-88.
· JOURNAL: Biosecurity Goes Global – (EMAIL) Malakoff, D. (2004). Biosecurity Goes Global. Science, 305(5691), 1706-1707.
· JOURNAL: Strategic Incentives in Biosecurity Actions: Theoretical and Empirical Analyses - (EMAIL) Kobayashi, M., & Melkonyan, T. (2011). Strategic Incentives in Biosecurity Actions: Theoretical and Empirical Analyses. Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 36(2), 242-262.
· JOURNAL: From biodefence to biosecurity: the Obama administration's strategy for countering biological threats – (EMAIL) KOBLENTZ, G. (2012). From biodefence to biosecurity: The Obama administration's strategy for countering biological threats. International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-),88(1), 131-148.
BIOSECURITY, A REAL CONCERN
Over the next few decades, the continued development of bio-technologies will provide major benefits to society. They will also pose significant and unprecedented global risks including new types of weapons of mass destruction, large scale quarantines due to contagious diseases, and accidental deaths of millions of people. For instance, if synthetic biology were more widely accessible, it would give terrorist groups the ability to synthesise pathogens more dangerous than smallpox. That is where “biosecurity” comes in. Biosecurity is essentially set procedures intended to protect humans and animals against disease or harmful biological agents. Natural pandemics and new scientifically engineered pathogens could potentially kill hundreds of millions or even billions of people. These scenarios might seem extreme or outlandish. But they are widely recognised as significant risks by experts in the relevant fields. To safely navigate these risks, and harness the potentially great benefits of these new technologies, we must proactively provide research, assessment, monitoring, and guidance, on a global level. Future progress in synthetic biology is likely to increase the risk and severity of pandemics from engineered pathogens. Historically, natural pandemics have been responsible for huge numbers of deaths. For example, we’ve recently seen the risks with Swine flu and Ebola, but they are far less in comparison to the Spanish flu which killed roughly 4% of the world’s population in 1918 to 1920. The influenza was the deadliest flu pandemic in modern history infecting an estimated 500 million people worldwide. That was about one-third of the earth’s population at the time and killed an estimated 20 million to 50 million victims which is more than all the casualties of World War I. Looking back further, the Black Death killed 30% to 60% of Europe’s population, which would today be 2 billion to 4 billion globally. A serious outbreak of an engineered pathogen could result in even larger numbers of deaths. Engineered pathogens could be designed to have long incubation periods, to be highly lethal and highly infectious. If released, this could cause a global catastrophe. Engineered pathogens are likely be much more difficult to control than other large threats like nuclear weapons, because the technology to produce or distribute them will likely require fewer resources and will be harder to monitor. Less money is invested in reducing the risks from engineered pathogens than the risks from nuclear weapons however. With biosecurity, there are promising paths to reducing the risks through regulating potentially dangerous research, improving early detection systems and developing better international emergency response plans.
The United States federal government spends around $6 billion annually on various programs related to biosecurity. This suggests that the area is more crowded than other pressing problems like risks from artificial intelligence and factory farming. Less than 10% of this spending goes to programs focused exclusively on biosecurity since most programs include other goals such as scientific research and general disaster preparedness. Even less is spent specifically on risks from future engineered pathogens. That is a serious issue as biosecurity and all of the possibilities that come with it are not being shown as much attention as it probably should be shown. That’s big. Especially since these risks could be substantially reduced through regulating potentially dangerous research. Reducing the chance of outbreaks is the first step. That gets done when we make sure that potentially dangerous research is handled swiftly and correctly. That means whatever needs to get shut down at a moment’s notice gets shut down and whatever may require further inquiry is done so cautiously. That goal also encompasses putting research and time into identifying the largest biosecurity risks and then challenging them. In doing that, we are acting on protecting ourselves from unprecedented threats as well as regulating potentially dangerous research. Some of that $6 billion the United States federal government dishes out needs to find its way to this point. Failure of oversight when it comes to protecting the public from dangerous biological agents is nothing new. Research says we've all been exposed to tens of thousands of virtually untested chemicals for decades now, about which we know little or even nothing. Every single amateur scientist can’t be stopped but by shedding light on the topic where it is currently rather dim, a difference is made. Perhaps by promoting the set of laws and safely procedures for all scientists whether amateur or professional, when working with biological agents that could potentially become dangerous, that goal can be achieved. When it comes to how dangerous chemicals are regulated in the North America, it seems there are no easy answers right now, but the researchers say, if there's to be a safer future for all of us, it can't just be left to the science community to figure out. "Closing the gap between evidence and policy will require that engaged citizens, both scientists and non-scientists, work to ensure our government officials pass health-protective policies based on the best available scientific evidence." By PETER DOCKRILL, (December 21, 2017). We Have Failed to Regulate Thousands of Potentially Hazardous Chemicals, Warn Scientists. Retrieved from https://www.sciencealert.com/you-exposed-thousands-untested-chemicals-for-decades-scientists-warn-hazardous-toxic
Improving early detection systems is another step to boosting biosecurity. Effective early detection systems consist of inventory, prevention, and monitoring programs. Prevention programs necessarily include an integrated process of risk and impact assessment, regulatory permitting, and quarantine. These fall underneath the umbrella of detection systems because threats can be detected through these practices. Significant weaknesses in the prevention programs often exist because of the lack of necessary taxonomic, behavioral, and ecological information to reduce uncertainties sufficiently to make well-informed choices. We need to identify the pathways by which harmful organisms are moved, rank them according to their potential for economic, ecological, agricultural, and human health effects, and develop ways to minimize the movement of harmful and potentially harmful organisms. Then we could detect organisms of concern, giving high priority to pathways and sites of potential invasion that are particularly high risk. We should build basic border control, risk and impact assessment, and quarantine capacity by enhancing the numbers and capabilities of personnel, employing more effective technologic systems, and improving scientific methods. Developing good screening systems and modifying existing screening systems effectively evaluate the risk of potentially harmful organisms already moving into or around North America. BioScience, Volume 52, Issue 7, 1 July 2002, Pages 593–600, Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1641/0006-3568(2002)052[0593:BMTACA]2.0.CO;2.
Developing better international emergency response plans rounds up what needs to get done to reduce the risks of biological agents. On a global scale, assessments show that many of the biological invasions that have caused the most economic and environmental damage were intentional. Developing this response program, in close cooperation with governments and other bodies to respond immediately to the presence of potentially harmful organisms as soon as they are detected along with having an emergency fund ready would be the best contingency plan.
Today, scientific advances are making it easier to create diseases much worse than anything nature could throw at us whether by accident or deliberately. We will want to introduce policies which lower the risks, or reduce the bad effects if they occur for the longer term. The threats primarily come from two sources: accidents and deliberate intent. By limiting research, making research safer, and preventing dangerous research from reaching scientists, we can lower the chances of threats occurring. If a bad outcome does occur, then we can improve our response. Government and policymakers need be able to recognize that protecting the country against harmful biological agents requires a biosecurity infrastructure and approach that minimizes and responds not only to the rare events of bioterrorism but also to the everyday biological agents, and scientifically engineered pathogens. All aspects of human and environmental well-being are vulnerable to violations of biosecurity. To have true protection, policies, regulations, and management strategies must be implemented through a solid approach of fragmented efforts, undertaken without cooperation and coordination among agencies and government, cannot be “just enough”. The risks of breaches and cracks in biosecurity will continue to rise, and the consequences may become more frequent and severe as environmental change, globalization, technological developments, and social stresses increase. To maintain biosecurity, significant attention must be paid to regulating potentially dangerous research, improving early detection systems and developing better international emergency response plans.
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